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Footnotes 
1. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003).
2. See, e.g., THOMAS KARFUNKEL & THOMAS.W. RYLEY, THE JEWISH SEAT:
ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE APPOINTMENT OF JEWS TO THE SUPREME
COURT (1978); BARBARA A. PERRY, A “REPRESENTATIVE” SUPREME
COURT? THE IMPACT OF RACE, RELIGION, AND GENDER ON
APPOINTMENTS (1991); JENNIFER M. LOWE, THE JEWISH JUSTICES OF
THE SUPREME COURT REVISITED: BRANDEIS TO FORTAS (1994). There
are currently six Catholics (Roberts, Alito, Kennedy, Scalia,
Sotomayor, and Thomas), three Jews (Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Kagan), and zero Protestants, so religious quotas on the Court
appear to be a thing of the past. However, some observers per-
ceived President George W. Bush’s nomination of Harriet Miers as
an attempt to establish an evangelical seat on the Court. Noam
Scheiber, Merit Scholars, 233(16) NEW REPUBLIC 6 (2005, Oct. 17). 
3. See, generally, BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN & MONICA K. MILLER, GOD IN
THE COURTROOM: RELIGION’S ROLE AT TRIAL (2009), Ch. 6. The pre-
sent article is an abbreviated summary of work contained therein.
4. On religion’s role in juror decision making, see BORNSTEIN &
MILLER, supra note 3, Ch. 3-5.
5. This is obviously less true for appellate judges, who decide cases
as a group. Although judicial conferences might resemble jury
deliberations in some respects, individual judges are nonetheless
considerably more autonomous than individual jurors (e.g., each
judge can write his or her own opinion).
6. For a discussion of the relationship between trial court judges’
religion and their decision making, see BORNSTEIN & MILLER, supra
note 3 at 98; GLEN SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: A READER IN
THEORY AND RESEARCH (1964).
7. See, generally, Anthony Champagne & Stuart S. Nagel, The
Psychology of Judging, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM (N.L.
Kerr & R.M. Bray eds., 1982); Edie Greene & Lawrence S.
Wrightsman, Decision Making by Juries and Judges: International
Perspectives, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY IN LEGAL CONTEXTS (D.
Carson & R. Bull eds., 2003); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993;
revised and published in 2002 as THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED).
8. Segal & Spaeth, supra note 7 at 65. Segal and Spaeth contrast the
attitudinal model with the legal model of judicial decision making,
whereby the court decides disputes “in light of the facts of the case
vis-à-vis precedent, the plain meaning of the Constitution and
statutes, the intent of the framers, and a balancing of societal ver-
sus constitutional interests.” Id. at 64.
9. E.g., C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior
of United States Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberty
and Economic Decisions, 1946–1978, 75 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 355
(1981); S. Sidney Ulmer, Social Background as an Indicator to the
Votes of Supreme Court Justices in Criminal Cases:  1947-1956
Terms, 17 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 622 (1973); Tracey E. George & Lee
Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AMER.
POL. SCI. REV. 323 (1992); Melinda G. Hall & Paul Brace, Toward
Like many other Americans, judges can have deep-seatedreligious convictions. Although their religious beliefs cer-tainly do not interfere with their job performance most of
the time, judges’ religion can occasionally become problem-
atic. Witness, for example, the case of Alabama Supreme Court
Chief Justice Roy Moore, who was removed from office in 2003
after he placed a 5,300-pound monument of the Ten
Commandments in the rotunda of the state judicial building
and refused to remove it despite being ordered to do so. He
installed the monument “in order to remind all Alabama citi-
zens of, among other things, his belief in the sovereignty of the
Judeo-Christian God over both the state and the church.”1
Religion, and its relationship to judges’ attitudes, also comes
up in the judicial nomination and confirmation process. This
is especially true with regard to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
for many years had purported Catholic and Jewish seats.2
An emphasis on religion in choosing judges naturally pre-
supposes the existence of a relationship between the particular
religion that a judge practices and the judge’s decisions.3 For
example, will Jewish judges be more lenient toward criminal
defendants than Protestant judges? Will evangelical judges
favor the death penalty? One might expect judges, as profes-
sionals deciding a large number of cases, to be able to ignore
extralegal factors such as their religious beliefs, yet two aspects
of judges’ religion suggest that it is a significant concern and at
least as likely to influence their decisions as jurors’ decisions.4
First, judges are solitary decision makers, so any influence of a
judge’s religion would not be diluted by countervailing reli-
gious (or nonreligious) influences as it would be for one juror
among many.5 Second, judges rule on matters of law as well as
determining factual matters. This opens up a new arena for
possible religious influence as the legal questions might them-
selves contain explicit or implicit religious elements (e.g., sep-
aration of church and state).
Most of the research that has been conducted on the rela-
tionship between judges’ religion and their decisions focuses on
appellate judges.6 There is a growing consensus that appellate
judges’ attitudes and beliefs are important predictors of their
decisions.7 This attitudinal model holds that an appellate court,
such as the U.S. Supreme Court, “decides disputes in light of
the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and val-
ues of the justices.”8 The attitudinal model is closely related to
the social background and extralegal models of judicial decision
making, which encompass a wide variety of demographic and
experiential variables, such as religion.9 Religion is undoubt-
edly one important factor—albeit only one of many social back-
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an Integrated Model of Judicial Voting Behavior, 20 AMER. POL. Q.,
147 (1992).  
10. See Champagne & Nagel, supra note 7; Stephen M. Feldman,
Empiricism, Religion, and Judicial Decision-making, 15 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 43 (2006); Raul A. Gonzalez, Climbing the Ladder
of Success: My Spiritual Journal, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1139 (1996);
KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS
(1995); Ulmer, “Social Background,” supra note 9. There are sev-
eral difficulties with attempting to use judges’ religious identifica-
tion as a predictor of their decisions. See Tracey E. George, Court
Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9 (2001). For example, adherents of any
religion vary widely in their degree of observance and particular
beliefs, often going against their religion’s official doctrine (e.g.,
many American Catholics’ pro-choice stance on abortion), and
religious groups’ status and perspective change over time (e.g., the
Catholic church’s evolving stance on capital punishment).
11. Recent Catholic nominees for federal judgeships, including
Supreme Court nominees, have been questioned about their posi-
tion on issues where the Catholic Church has taken an official
stance, such as abortion and capital punishment. E.g., Sanford
Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion:
Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047 (1990;
reprinted in SANFORD LEVINSON, WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY
[2003]); Sanford Levinson, Is It Possible to Have a Serious
Discussion about Religious Commitment and Judicial
Responsibilities? 4 UNIV. ST. THOMAS L.J. 280 (2006). As a rule, they
have been evasive and/or relied on legal precedent in responding,
refusing to allow their personal beliefs to become part of the
process.
12. E.g., GLEN SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED: PSYCHOMETRIC
ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT IDEOLOGY (1974); Segal & Spaeth,
supra note 7; Lawrence S. Wrightsman, The Psychology of the
Supreme Court (2006).
13. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 7.
14. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 12.
15. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 12.
16. Stuart S. Nagel, “The Relationship Between the Political and
Ethnic Affiliation of Judges, and Their Decision-making,” in
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH (G. Schubert
ed., 1964); see also STUART S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A
BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE (1969).
17. “More liberal” was defined as voting for the criminal defendant,
the administrative agency, the wife, and the employee, respec-
tively.
18. Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of
Appeals Revisited, 69 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 491 (1975); see also
Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of
Appeals, 1961–1964, 60 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 374 (1966).
19. DANIEL.R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW (2003). The
cases covered lesbian/gay family matters (including same-sex mar-
riage), sexual orientation discrimination, gays in the military, con-
sensual sodomy and solicitation laws, and free speech/association
of gays and lesbians.
20. Donald R. Songer, & Susan J. Tabrizi, The Religious Right in Court:
The Decision Making of Christian Evangelicals in State Supreme
Courts, 61 J. POL. 507 (1999).
ground characteristics—influencing judges’ attitudes, values,
personalities, and ideologies.10 The most obvious examples are
probably the Catholic Church’s stances on abortion and the
death penalty, but religion doubtlessly influences case-relevant
attitudes in more subtle ways as well.11
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Several quantitative analyses of appellate court decisions—
including, but not limited to, the U.S. Supreme Court—pro-
vide support for the attitudinal model in general.12 Attitudes
are important not only in determining the disposition of cases,
but also in the selection of cases (i.e., granting of certiorari)
and assignment of majority-opinion writing duties.13 Attitudes
are especially likely to matter in certain types of cases or ones
in which the appellate court is closely divided.14 For example,
Wrightsman found that ideology (i.e., liberalism vs. conser-
vatism) predicted Supreme Court justices’ votes better in cases
involving criminal defendants’ or prisoners’ rights than in
other kinds of cases.15
Not all of these studies included judges’ religion as a social
background variable, but several have. Nagel conducted a
study of judicial decisions as a function of judges’ religion
(among other social background variables), using as a sample
313 judges of state and federal supreme courts for the year
1955.16 There were too few Jewish judges in the sample for
comparison purposes, so the comparison was limited to
Protestant (mostly Methodist, Presbyterian, Episcopalian, and
Baptist) versus Catholic judges. He found that Catholic judges
were significantly more likely than Protestant judges to show a
liberal voting pattern in nonunanimous cases for 4 (of 15 total)
types of cases:  those involving criminal matters, business reg-
ulation, divorce settlement, and employee injury.17 Protestant
judges were more liberal in none of the case types. 
Goldman likewise compared Catholic and Protestant appel-
late judges, using as a database all nonunanimous decisions by
U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1965 through 1971.18 He catego-
rized the legal issues somewhat differently from Nagel, but the
results were generally consistent:  Catholic judges were more
liberal in certain types of cases, in the sense of being more likely
to side with injured persons and to vote for the economic
underdog. Protestant judges were never more liberal, and reli-
gion exerted no influence in a number of types of cases. Again,
there were too few Jewish judges to include in the statistical
analyses, but their median scores were more liberal than both
Catholics and Protestants for virtually all kinds of cases.
Other studies have focused on a narrower spectrum of
cases. For example, Pinello analyzed all published appellate
court decisions (state and federal; N = 468) from 1981-2000
that dealt with issues falling under the rubric of “gay rights.”19
The findings varied somewhat depending on the legal issue
and type of court (e.g., intermediate appellate court vs. court
of last resort), but overall, Jewish judges were relatively liberal
compared to Protestant judges, whereas Catholic judges were
relatively conservative in dealing with these issues. 
Songer and Tabrizi examined the votes of state supreme
court justices on three issues—death penalty, gender discrimi-
nation, and obscenity—from 1970 to 1993.20 They classified
judges as Evangelical Christian, mainline Protestant, Catholic,
or Jewish. Even after controlling for a number of other vari-
ables (e.g., party affiliation, prosecutorial experience), judges’
21. By “major religious classifications,” we mean the most common
taxonomy of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish. It would be inter-
esting to see where judges from non-Judeo-Christian religions,
such as Islam, fall on the spectrum, but no sample to date has
included enough such judges for analysis.
22. PERRY, supra note 2 at 46.
23. Thomas C. Berg & William G. Ross, Some Religiously Devout
Justices: Historical Notes and Comments,” 81 MARQ. L. REV. 383
(1998); Harold W. Chase et al., Catholics on the Court, Sept. 26
NEW REPUBLIC 13 (1960); JAMES HITCHCOCK, THE SUPREME COURT
AND RELIGION IN AMERICAN LIFE (2004).
24. Ulmer, “Social Background,” supra note 9.
25. Although this result supports the social background model, it
should be noted that the sample was relatively small (14 justices),
and only 3 of the justices were non-Protestant. Two were Catholic
(Murphy and Brennan), and one was Jewish (Frankfurter). In
their analysis of Supreme Court voting behavior in civil-rights and
economics cases over a longer time period (1916-1988), Tate and
Handberg found no difference between Protestant and non-
Protestant justices. C. Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, Time Binding
and Theory Building in Personal Attribute Models of Supreme Court
Voting Behavior, 1916-88, 35 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 460 (1991).
26. Catholic justices on the Canadian Supreme Court were more lib-
eral than non-Catholic justices in both civil-rights and economics
cases. C. Neal Tate & Panu Sittiwong, Decision Making in the
Canadian Supreme Court:  Extending the Personal Attributes Model
Across Nations, 51 J. POL. 900 (1989).
27. S. Sidney Ulmer, Dissent Behavior and the Social Background of
Supreme Court Justices, 32 J. POL. 580 (1970). The behavior of
some of the current Catholic justices, such as Thomas and Scalia,
would appear to continue this tradition.
28. FRANK J. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS OF CHURCH AND STATE (1976).
29. Id. at 220.
30. Barbara.M. Yarnold, Did Circuit Courts of Appeals Judges Overcome
Their Own Religions in Cases Involving Religious Liberties? 1970-
1990, 42 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 79 (2000).
religion was strongly associated with their voting behavior.
Evangelical judges were significantly more conservative than
judges from other religious backgrounds in all three types of
cases—that is, they more often voted to uphold the death
penalty, maintain the gender gap, and restrict free speech in
obscenity cases. Jewish judges were consistently the most lib-
eral; mainline Protestant judges were liberal on the death
penalty and obscenity, but less so on gender discrimination
(though they were still more liberal than evangelical judges).
Of the various groups, Catholic judges’ behavior varied the
most depending on the issue:  They were liberal on gender dis-
crimination, in the middle on the death penalty, and nearly as
conservative as the evangelical judges on obscenity. Thus,
there are differences among Protestant Christian faiths as well
as between the major religious classifications.21 This finding
makes sense in light of the wide diversity of beliefs among dif-
ferent Protestant denominations.
The U.S. Supreme Court receives special scrutiny in many
respects, and the relationship between judges’ personal attrib-
utes and their decisions is no exception. At a superficial level,
there seems to be little evidence that Supreme Court justices’
religion is directly associated with their decisions. Catholic jus-
tices have ranged from very conservative (e.g., Butler, Scalia,
Thomas, Alito) to very liberal (e.g., Murphy, Brennan), and
Perry maintains that “Catholics on the Court have exhibited an
exaggerated degree of religious impartiality.”22 For example,
Frank Murphy, perhaps the most devout of the 19th and early
20th century Catholic justices, upheld the doctrine of church-
state separation even when it went against Church doctrine.23
However, empirical studies that have focused on specific
issues suggest the existence of a relationship between judges’
religion and case outcomes. For example, Ulmer analyzed the
voting behavior of the 14 justices who sat on the U.S. Supreme
Court from 1947-1956.24 He found that non-Protestant justices
were less likely than Protestant justices to support the govern-
ment (means of 28% and 48%, respectively).25 This pattern of
findings has been replicated cross-nationally.26 Catholic U.S.
Supreme Court justices differ from their Protestant brethren in
some procedural respects as well as on substantive matters in
that Catholic justices are more likely to write dissenting opin-
ions.27
JUDGES’ RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM CASES
The empirical studies described above suggest that judges’
religion matters in some types of cases but not others. One
might reasonably expect it to matter most in cases that are
directly concerned with religion, such as those that deal with
the religious-liberties clauses of the First Amendment (i.e.,
Free Exercise and Establishment). Several studies of judicial
decisions in religious-liberties cases have addressed, among
other factors, the role played by a judge’s own religion.
In what is perhaps the earliest such study, Sorauf analyzed
67 church-state separation cases decided by high appellate
courts (both state and federal) from 1951-1971.28 Sorauf found
that judges’ religion was strongly associated with their behav-
ior in these cases:  “Nothing explains the behavior of the
judges in these church-state cases as frequently as do their own
personal religious histories and affiliations. Jewish judges vote
heavily separationist, Catholics vote heavily accommodation-
ist, and Protestants divide.”29 The pattern was strongest in
nonunanimous appellate cases, where Jewish judges voted for
separation 82.4% of the time, compared to 56.1% for conserv-
ative Protestants (e.g., Baptist, Methodist), 48.7% for liberal
Protestants (e.g., Episcopalians, Presbyterians), and 15.6% for
Catholics; but the trend was present in unanimous appellate
cases and for trial court judges as well. 
Yarnold examined all cases in the federal circuit courts from
1970-1990 that concerned religious liberties (N = 1,356).30
Judges represented a wide range of religions, including
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31. Lutheran judges’ tendency to take an anti-religion position in
deciding these cases was not statistically significant.
32. Gregory C. Sisk et al., Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decision
Making: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65
OHIO ST. L. J. 491 (2004).
33. Most “other Christians” simply identified themselves as
Protestant, whereas “other” religions included Unitarians and
Mormons.
34. Sisk et al., supra note 32 at 614.
35. Id. at 582.
36. Id. at 585-91.
37. Id. at 590.
38. See, e.g., Ruth B. Ginsburg, Introduction, in THE JEWISH JUSTICES OF
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Catholicism, Judaism, and a number of Protestant denomina-
tions. The dependent variable was whether the decision was
beneficial to religion, in the sense of promoting litigants’—
regardless of which side they were on—ability to practice their
faith. Yarnold found that, except for Lutherans, all judges
(including the nonreligious ones) generally adopted a pro-reli-
gion position.31 However, Catholic and Baptist judges were sig-
nificantly more likely than other groups to rule in a pro-reli-
gion fashion. 
Sisk and colleagues partially confirmed these findings in a
similar, more recent study that examined all published deci-
sions (N = 729) in religious-liberties cases in the federal courts
(district courts and Courts of Appeals) from 1986-1995.32
They categorized judges as Catholic, mainline Protestant (e.g.,
Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Methodist), Baptist, Other
Christian, Jewish, Other, or having no religious affiliation.33 In
addition to coding judges’ religion, they also coded claimants’
religion and the religious demographics of the community
where the judge maintained chambers (specifically, the
Catholic and Jewish percentages in the community, the total
adherence rate to any religious group, and a score for the com-
munity’s religious homogeneity). 
They concluded that “the single most prominent, salient,
and consistent influence on judicial decision making was reli-
gion—religion in terms of affiliation of the claimant, the back-
ground of the judge, and the demographics of the commu-
nity.”34 Specifically, Jewish judges and judges from “non-main-
stream” Christian denominations (i.e., neither Catholic nor
mainline Protestant) were significantly more likely to approve
of accommodation requests in free-exercise cases. Jewish
judges were also significantly more likely to uphold claims
challenging governmental acknowledgment of religion under
the Establishment Clause, even when controlling for variables
such as party affiliation and ideology.35 The behavior of
Catholic judges was less straightforward. Catholic judges dif-
fered from mainline Protestant judges but only in cases raising
certain kinds of issues, such as school-accommodation cases
(where they were more receptive) and cases challenging gov-
ernment aid to parochial schools (where they were less recep-
tive). With respect to the community variables, Sisk and col-
leagues found that judges living in more religious communities
were more liberal, in the sense of voting for claimants in both
free-exercise and establishment cases (i.e., supporting accom-
modation in the former and separation in the latter).36 Judges
were also more liberal as the percentage of Jews in their com-
munity increased.37
CONCLUSION
Judging is often portrayed as a dispassionate exercise based
on facts and legal precedent; but empirical scholarship on
judges shows that psychological, attitudinal, and background
factors play a part in the process as well. On the whole, there
appear to be systematic differences in judges’ decision making
as a function of their religion. Jewish judges, on average, are
consistently more liberal, arguably because of their stronger
identification with the downtrodden and disenfranchised,
owing to their own outsider status.38 Catholic judges’ liberal-
ism varies more as a function of the individual (compare, e.g.,
Brennan vs. Scalia) and the issue, with Catholic judges being
more liberal than non-Catholics on some issues but more con-
servative on others. One explanation of this pattern is that the
Catholic Church has taken an explicit position on many social
policy issues, to which the majority of pious Catholics adhere.
Yet there is no “official Jewish position” on these same issues,
freeing Jewish judges to side with the underdog across a range
of different types of cases. Evangelical judges are relatively
conservative. Mainline Protestants, who serve as the reference
group in the majority of studies, are harder to characterize,
which is not surprising given the high diversity of denomina-
tions and beliefs in such a broad classification. The pattern of
findings characterizes both cases where religion is explicitly at
issue, as in religious-freedom cases, and cases where religion is
totally irrelevant. Thus, religion is yet another factor to con-
sider in trying to understand and predict judges’ decisions.
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